David McNeill: Who's telling the truth on the Fukushima meltdown?

Newsweek Japan is one of many publications that have criticized âsensationalistâ foreign reporters, who âfailed to accomplish their missionâ during the disaster.
Newsweek says some journalists ran away and many of those who stayed massively overreacted to the threat from the crippled reactors.
Hyperventilating foreign hacks were an easy, and sometimes deserving, target. Many observers recall CNNâs Jonathan Mannâs purple-veined report that radiation levels had increased to â10 million timesâ safe levels near the Fukushima plant, then ignoring a correction by operator TEPCO that knocked several zeroes off that estimate.
Missing words
But although Japanese newspapers and TV reporters mostly kept their heads, they also concealed or delayed releasing information about what was going on inside the Fukushima plant.
One of the more striking aspects of the local media coverage of Fukushima was the missing word -- âmeltdown.â It seemed reasonable to speculate, from March 11-15, that this is precisely what happened. One reason was the repeated news of cesium dispersed in the atmosphere on March 12.
Does media responsibility include outright deception?
Haruki Madarame, the Chair of the Nuclear Safety Commission now says he concluded very early on that meltdown had happened, and informed the government. Former Washington TBS Bureau Chief Toyohiro Akiyama, who has a farm in Fukushima, made a similar assessment and fled in his car to Gunma.
âThere was a blackout in the media of the word,â he says in an interview this month with the Foreign Correspondentsâ Club magazine, âNo.1 Shimbun.â In April the head of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, Takashi Sawada, also said that fuel rods in reactors 1 and 3 had melted. Yet, it took over two months for newspapers and TV here to begin using the word. Why?
Japanâs press club system means the big newspapers and TV companies channel and amplify information directly from the government, TEPCO and The Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency. That meant they were admirably disciplined, descriptive, somber and focused on the facts.
They were also discouraged from speculating on what might be going on inside the stricken plant, although many reporters must have privately concluded the worst.
Real responsibility?

But does this responsibility mean simply not exaggerating, or does it also include concealing or delaying information or even outright deception?
As the Nuclear Safety Agency warned on March 12 that metal containers of uranium fuel inside Reactor 1 had probably started melting, University of Tokyo Professor Naoto Sekimura repeatedly popped up on TV to wave away our concerns.
âOnly a small part of the fuel may have melted and leaked outside,â he said. Residents near the power station should âstay calm,â because âmost of the fuel remains inside the reactor, which has stopped operating and is being cooled.â
How could Professor Sekimura have possibly known what he was saying, and shouldnât that broadcaster have balanced his (clearly wrong) assessment with an opposite view. Or was that risking panic?
Readers will have to ask themselves how they feel about being kept in the dark âfor their own good.â
Assume the worst
Japanese freelancer Takashi Uesugi recently suggested that the media could have behaved differently. âThe correct way to report about the events at the nuclear power plant is to assume the worst case and write about it, then to also add what the current situation is in relation to that,â he said.
âNewspapers and television shouldnât say, âDonât worry, itâs safe. You donât need to run away,â like Japanâs have.â
We might also cite the example of MOX fuel and plutonium, a substance so toxic âthat a teaspoon-sized cube of it would suffice to kill 10 million people,â in Reactor 3 at Fukushima.
Newspaper and TV reports in Japan essentially banished the words from their reports. MOX is also used in the Hamaoka nuclear plant, which, until Prime Minister Naoto Kan ordered it shut last month was largely unknown to ordinary Japanese citizens.
Japanese magazines, however, have been the most critical, unrestrained and informed publications in the world since March. âShukan Shinchoâ calls the TEPCO management âwar criminalsâ. âShukan Gendaiâ dubbed professor Sekimura and pro-nuclear scientists âtonchinkanâ -- roughly, âblundering.â
Pants on fire
Haruki Madarame is now widely called âDetarameâ Haruki, meaning heâs a liar or a bullshitter. But shouldnât newspapers and TV news, the publicâs watchdog, be timely and up to date?
For all its faults, it was foreign journalism that often bared its teeth first. âThe Washington Postâ first criticized the âvanishing actâ of TEPCO boss Masataka Shimizu, on March 29.
It was the âNew York Timesâ that consistently pursued TEPCO for its disgusting treatment of workers inside the Fukushima plant. When the Big Media corps pulled out of Minami-soma and other towns in Fukushima, Chinese, Korean and European journalists were back first to talk to the citizens left behind.
Airbrushed media coverage is hardly an exclusively Japanese phenomenon. Look behind the industry here and youâll find a very familiar tale of advertising clout and industry-media ties.
Japanâs power-supply industry, collectively, is Japanâs biggest advertiser, spending „88 billion (US$1 billion) a year, according to the Nikkei Advertising Research Institute.
TEPCOâs „24.4 billion alone is roughly half what a global firm as large as Toyota spends in a year. Finding out what that money buys is the job of all journalists, regardless of where they come from.









